minio/cmd/sts-handlers.go

1054 lines
35 KiB
Go

/// Copyright (c) 2015-2021 MinIO, Inc.
//
// This file is part of MinIO Object Storage stack
//
// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.
//
// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
// GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
//
// You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
// along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
package cmd
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/base64"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/minio/madmin-go/v3"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/auth"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/config/identity/openid"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/hash/sha256"
xhttp "github.com/minio/minio/internal/http"
"github.com/minio/minio/internal/logger"
"github.com/minio/mux"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v2/policy"
"github.com/minio/pkg/v2/wildcard"
)
const (
// STS API version.
stsAPIVersion = "2011-06-15"
stsVersion = "Version"
stsAction = "Action"
stsPolicy = "Policy"
stsToken = "Token"
stsRoleArn = "RoleArn"
stsWebIdentityToken = "WebIdentityToken"
stsWebIdentityAccessToken = "WebIdentityAccessToken" // only valid if UserInfo is enabled.
stsDurationSeconds = "DurationSeconds"
stsLDAPUsername = "LDAPUsername"
stsLDAPPassword = "LDAPPassword"
// STS API action constants
clientGrants = "AssumeRoleWithClientGrants"
webIdentity = "AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"
ldapIdentity = "AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity"
clientCertificate = "AssumeRoleWithCertificate"
customTokenIdentity = "AssumeRoleWithCustomToken"
assumeRole = "AssumeRole"
stsRequestBodyLimit = 10 * (1 << 20) // 10 MiB
// JWT claim keys
expClaim = "exp"
subClaim = "sub"
audClaim = "aud"
issClaim = "iss"
// JWT claim to check the parent user
parentClaim = "parent"
// LDAP claim keys
ldapUser = "ldapUser" // this is a key name for a DN value
ldapUserN = "ldapUsername" // this is a key name for the short/login username
// Role Claim key
roleArnClaim = "roleArn"
)
// stsAPIHandlers implements and provides http handlers for AWS STS API.
type stsAPIHandlers struct{}
// registerSTSRouter - registers AWS STS compatible APIs.
func registerSTSRouter(router *mux.Router) {
// Initialize STS.
sts := &stsAPIHandlers{}
// STS Router
stsRouter := router.NewRoute().PathPrefix(SlashSeparator).Subrouter()
// Assume roles with no JWT, handles AssumeRole.
stsRouter.Methods(http.MethodPost).MatcherFunc(func(r *http.Request, rm *mux.RouteMatch) bool {
ctypeOk := wildcard.MatchSimple("application/x-www-form-urlencoded*", r.Header.Get(xhttp.ContentType))
authOk := wildcard.MatchSimple(signV4Algorithm+"*", r.Header.Get(xhttp.Authorization))
noQueries := len(r.URL.RawQuery) == 0
return ctypeOk && authOk && noQueries
}).HandlerFunc(httpTraceAll(sts.AssumeRole))
// Assume roles with JWT handler, handles both ClientGrants and WebIdentity.
stsRouter.Methods(http.MethodPost).MatcherFunc(func(r *http.Request, rm *mux.RouteMatch) bool {
ctypeOk := wildcard.MatchSimple("application/x-www-form-urlencoded*", r.Header.Get(xhttp.ContentType))
noQueries := len(r.URL.RawQuery) == 0
return ctypeOk && noQueries
}).HandlerFunc(httpTraceAll(sts.AssumeRoleWithSSO))
// AssumeRoleWithClientGrants
stsRouter.Methods(http.MethodPost).HandlerFunc(httpTraceAll(sts.AssumeRoleWithClientGrants)).
Queries(stsAction, clientGrants).
Queries(stsVersion, stsAPIVersion).
Queries(stsToken, "{Token:.*}")
// AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity
stsRouter.Methods(http.MethodPost).HandlerFunc(httpTraceAll(sts.AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity)).
Queries(stsAction, webIdentity).
Queries(stsVersion, stsAPIVersion).
Queries(stsWebIdentityToken, "{Token:.*}")
// AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity
stsRouter.Methods(http.MethodPost).HandlerFunc(httpTraceAll(sts.AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity)).
Queries(stsAction, ldapIdentity).
Queries(stsVersion, stsAPIVersion).
Queries(stsLDAPUsername, "{LDAPUsername:.*}").
Queries(stsLDAPPassword, "{LDAPPassword:.*}")
// AssumeRoleWithCertificate
stsRouter.Methods(http.MethodPost).HandlerFunc(httpTraceAll(sts.AssumeRoleWithCertificate)).
Queries(stsAction, clientCertificate).
Queries(stsVersion, stsAPIVersion)
// AssumeRoleWithCustomToken
stsRouter.Methods(http.MethodPost).HandlerFunc(httpTraceAll(sts.AssumeRoleWithCustomToken)).
Queries(stsAction, customTokenIdentity).
Queries(stsVersion, stsAPIVersion)
}
func apiToSTSError(authErr APIErrorCode) (stsErrCode STSErrorCode) {
switch authErr {
case ErrSignatureDoesNotMatch, ErrInvalidAccessKeyID, ErrAccessKeyDisabled:
return ErrSTSAccessDenied
case ErrServerNotInitialized:
return ErrSTSNotInitialized
case ErrInternalError:
return ErrSTSInternalError
default:
return ErrSTSAccessDenied
}
}
func checkAssumeRoleAuth(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request) (auth.Credentials, APIErrorCode) {
if !isRequestSignatureV4(r) {
return auth.Credentials{}, ErrAccessDenied
}
s3Err := isReqAuthenticated(ctx, r, globalSite.Region(), serviceSTS)
if s3Err != ErrNone {
return auth.Credentials{}, s3Err
}
user, _, s3Err := getReqAccessKeyV4(r, globalSite.Region(), serviceSTS)
if s3Err != ErrNone {
return auth.Credentials{}, s3Err
}
// Temporary credentials or Service accounts cannot generate further temporary credentials.
if user.IsTemp() || user.IsServiceAccount() {
return auth.Credentials{}, ErrAccessDenied
}
// Session tokens are not allowed in STS AssumeRole requests.
if getSessionToken(r) != "" {
return auth.Credentials{}, ErrAccessDenied
}
return user, ErrNone
}
func parseForm(r *http.Request) error {
if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
return err
}
for k, v := range r.PostForm {
if _, ok := r.Form[k]; !ok {
r.Form[k] = v
}
}
return nil
}
// getTokenSigningKey returns secret key used to sign JWT session tokens
func getTokenSigningKey() (string, error) {
secret := globalActiveCred.SecretKey
if globalSiteReplicationSys.isEnabled() {
c, err := globalSiteReplicatorCred.Get(GlobalContext)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return c.SecretKey, nil
}
return secret, nil
}
// AssumeRole - implementation of AWS STS API AssumeRole to get temporary
// credentials for regular users on Minio.
// https://docs.aws.amazon.com/STS/latest/APIReference/API_AssumeRole.html
func (sts *stsAPIHandlers) AssumeRole(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := newContext(r, w, "AssumeRole")
claims := make(map[string]interface{})
defer logger.AuditLog(ctx, w, r, claims)
// Check auth here (otherwise r.Form will have unexpected values from
// the call to `parseForm` below), but return failure only after we are
// able to validate that it is a valid STS request, so that we are able
// to send an appropriate audit log.
user, apiErrCode := checkAssumeRoleAuth(ctx, r)
if err := parseForm(r); err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, err)
return
}
if r.Form.Get(stsVersion) != stsAPIVersion {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSMissingParameter, fmt.Errorf("Invalid STS API version %s, expecting %s", r.Form.Get(stsVersion), stsAPIVersion))
return
}
action := r.Form.Get(stsAction)
switch action {
case assumeRole:
default:
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, fmt.Errorf("Unsupported action %s", action))
return
}
ctx = newContext(r, w, action)
// Validate the authentication result here so that failures will be audit-logged.
if apiErrCode != ErrNone {
stsErr := apiToSTSError(apiErrCode)
// Borrow the description error from the API error code
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, stsErr, fmt.Errorf(errorCodes[apiErrCode].Description))
return
}
sessionPolicyStr := r.Form.Get(stsPolicy)
// https://docs.aws.amazon.com/STS/latest/APIReference/API_AssumeRole.html
// The plain text that you use for both inline and managed session
// policies shouldn't exceed 2048 characters.
if len(sessionPolicyStr) > 2048 {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, errSessionPolicyTooLarge)
return
}
if len(sessionPolicyStr) > 0 {
sessionPolicy, err := policy.ParseConfig(bytes.NewReader([]byte(sessionPolicyStr)))
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, err)
return
}
// Version in policy must not be empty
if sessionPolicy.Version == "" {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, fmt.Errorf("Version cannot be empty expecting '2012-10-17'"))
return
}
}
duration, err := openid.GetDefaultExpiration(r.Form.Get(stsDurationSeconds))
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, err)
return
}
claims[expClaim] = UTCNow().Add(duration).Unix()
claims[parentClaim] = user.AccessKey
// Validate that user.AccessKey's policies can be retrieved - it may not
// be in case the user is disabled.
if _, err = globalIAMSys.PolicyDBGet(user.AccessKey, user.Groups...); err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, err)
return
}
if len(sessionPolicyStr) > 0 {
claims[policy.SessionPolicyName] = base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(sessionPolicyStr))
}
secret, err := getTokenSigningKey()
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
return
}
cred, err := auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(claims, secret)
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
return
}
// Set the parent of the temporary access key, so that it's access
// policy is inherited from `user.AccessKey`.
cred.ParentUser = user.AccessKey
// Set the newly generated credentials.
updatedAt, err := globalIAMSys.SetTempUser(ctx, cred.AccessKey, cred, "")
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
return
}
// Call hook for site replication.
if cred.ParentUser != globalActiveCred.AccessKey {
replLogIf(ctx, globalSiteReplicationSys.IAMChangeHook(ctx, madmin.SRIAMItem{
Type: madmin.SRIAMItemSTSAcc,
STSCredential: &madmin.SRSTSCredential{
AccessKey: cred.AccessKey,
SecretKey: cred.SecretKey,
SessionToken: cred.SessionToken,
ParentUser: cred.ParentUser,
},
UpdatedAt: updatedAt,
}))
}
assumeRoleResponse := &AssumeRoleResponse{
Result: AssumeRoleResult{
Credentials: cred,
},
}
assumeRoleResponse.ResponseMetadata.RequestID = w.Header().Get(xhttp.AmzRequestID)
writeSuccessResponseXML(w, encodeResponse(assumeRoleResponse))
}
func (sts *stsAPIHandlers) AssumeRoleWithSSO(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := newContext(r, w, "AssumeRoleSSOCommon")
claims := make(map[string]interface{})
defer logger.AuditLog(ctx, w, r, claims)
// Parse the incoming form data.
if err := parseForm(r); err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, err)
return
}
if r.Form.Get(stsVersion) != stsAPIVersion {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSMissingParameter, fmt.Errorf("Invalid STS API version %s, expecting %s", r.Form.Get("Version"), stsAPIVersion))
return
}
action := r.Form.Get(stsAction)
switch action {
case ldapIdentity:
sts.AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity(w, r)
return
case clientGrants, webIdentity:
default:
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, fmt.Errorf("Unsupported action %s", action))
return
}
ctx = newContext(r, w, action)
token := r.Form.Get(stsToken)
if token == "" {
token = r.Form.Get(stsWebIdentityToken)
}
accessToken := r.Form.Get(stsWebIdentityAccessToken)
// RoleARN parameter processing: If a role ARN is given in the request, we
// use that and validate the authentication request. If not, we assume this
// is an STS request for a claim based IDP (if one is present) and set
// roleArn = openid.DummyRoleARN.
//
// Currently, we do not support multiple claim based IDPs, as there is no
// defined parameter to disambiguate the intended IDP in this STS request.
roleArn := openid.DummyRoleARN
roleArnStr := r.Form.Get(stsRoleArn)
if roleArnStr != "" {
var err error
roleArn, _, err = globalIAMSys.GetRolePolicy(roleArnStr)
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue,
fmt.Errorf("Error processing %s parameter: %v", stsRoleArn, err))
return
}
}
if !globalIAMSys.Initialized() {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSIAMNotInitialized, errIAMNotInitialized)
return
}
// Validate JWT; check clientID in claims matches the one associated with the roleArn
if err := globalIAMSys.OpenIDConfig.Validate(r.Context(), roleArn, token, accessToken, r.Form.Get(stsDurationSeconds), claims); err != nil {
switch err {
case openid.ErrTokenExpired:
switch action {
case clientGrants:
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSClientGrantsExpiredToken, err)
case webIdentity:
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSWebIdentityExpiredToken, err)
}
return
case auth.ErrInvalidDuration:
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, err)
return
}
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, err)
return
}
var policyName string
if roleArnStr != "" && globalIAMSys.HasRolePolicy() {
// If roleArn is used, we set it as a claim, and use the
// associated policy when credentials are used.
claims[roleArnClaim] = roleArn.String()
} else {
// If no role policy is configured, then we use claims from the
// JWT. This is a MinIO STS API specific value, this value
// should be set and configured on your identity provider as
// part of JWT custom claims.
policySet, ok := policy.GetPoliciesFromClaims(claims, iamPolicyClaimNameOpenID())
policies := strings.Join(policySet.ToSlice(), ",")
if ok {
policyName = globalIAMSys.CurrentPolicies(policies)
}
if newGlobalAuthZPluginFn() == nil {
if !ok {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue,
fmt.Errorf("%s claim missing from the JWT token, credentials will not be generated", iamPolicyClaimNameOpenID()))
return
} else if policyName == "" {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue,
fmt.Errorf("None of the given policies (`%s`) are defined, credentials will not be generated", policies))
return
}
}
claims[iamPolicyClaimNameOpenID()] = policyName
}
sessionPolicyStr := r.Form.Get(stsPolicy)
// https://docs.aws.amazon.com/STS/latest/APIReference/API_AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity.html
// The plain text that you use for both inline and managed session
// policies shouldn't exceed 2048 characters.
if len(sessionPolicyStr) > 2048 {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, fmt.Errorf("Session policy should not exceed 2048 characters"))
return
}
if len(sessionPolicyStr) > 0 {
sessionPolicy, err := policy.ParseConfig(bytes.NewReader([]byte(sessionPolicyStr)))
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, err)
return
}
// Version in policy must not be empty
if sessionPolicy.Version == "" {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, fmt.Errorf("Invalid session policy version"))
return
}
claims[policy.SessionPolicyName] = base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(sessionPolicyStr))
}
secret, err := getTokenSigningKey()
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
return
}
cred, err := auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(claims, secret)
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
return
}
// https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#ClaimStability
// claim is only considered stable when subject and iss are used together
// this is to ensure that ParentUser doesn't change and we get to use
// parentUser as per the requirements for service accounts for OpenID
// based logins.
var subFromToken string
if v, ok := claims[subClaim]; ok {
subFromToken, _ = v.(string)
}
if subFromToken == "" {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue,
errors.New("STS JWT Token has `sub` claim missing, `sub` claim is mandatory"))
return
}
var issFromToken string
if v, ok := claims[issClaim]; ok {
issFromToken, _ = v.(string)
}
// Since issFromToken can have `/` characters (it is typically the
// provider URL), we hash and encode it to base64 here. This is needed
// because there will be a policy mapping stored on drives whose
// filename is this parentUser: therefore, it needs to have only valid
// filename characters and needs to have bounded length.
{
h := sha256.New()
h.Write([]byte("openid:" + subFromToken + ":" + issFromToken))
bs := h.Sum(nil)
cred.ParentUser = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(bs)
}
// Deny this assume role request if the policy that the user intends to bind
// has a sts:DurationSeconds condition, which is not satisfied as well
{
p := policyName
if p == "" {
var err error
_, p, err = globalIAMSys.GetRolePolicy(roleArnStr)
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSAccessDenied, err)
return
}
}
if !globalIAMSys.doesPolicyAllow(p, policy.Args{
DenyOnly: true,
Action: policy.AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityAction,
ConditionValues: getSTSConditionValues(r, "", cred),
Claims: cred.Claims,
}) {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSAccessDenied, errors.New("this user does not have enough permission"))
return
}
}
// Set the newly generated credentials.
updatedAt, err := globalIAMSys.SetTempUser(ctx, cred.AccessKey, cred, policyName)
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
return
}
// Call hook for site replication.
replLogIf(ctx, globalSiteReplicationSys.IAMChangeHook(ctx, madmin.SRIAMItem{
Type: madmin.SRIAMItemSTSAcc,
STSCredential: &madmin.SRSTSCredential{
AccessKey: cred.AccessKey,
SecretKey: cred.SecretKey,
SessionToken: cred.SessionToken,
ParentUser: cred.ParentUser,
ParentPolicyMapping: policyName,
},
UpdatedAt: updatedAt,
}))
var encodedSuccessResponse []byte
switch action {
case clientGrants:
clientGrantsResponse := &AssumeRoleWithClientGrantsResponse{
Result: ClientGrantsResult{
Credentials: cred,
SubjectFromToken: subFromToken,
},
}
clientGrantsResponse.ResponseMetadata.RequestID = w.Header().Get(xhttp.AmzRequestID)
encodedSuccessResponse = encodeResponse(clientGrantsResponse)
case webIdentity:
webIdentityResponse := &AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityResponse{
Result: WebIdentityResult{
Credentials: cred,
SubjectFromWebIdentityToken: subFromToken,
},
}
webIdentityResponse.ResponseMetadata.RequestID = w.Header().Get(xhttp.AmzRequestID)
encodedSuccessResponse = encodeResponse(webIdentityResponse)
}
writeSuccessResponseXML(w, encodedSuccessResponse)
}
// AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity - implementation of AWS STS API supporting OAuth2.0
// users from web identity provider such as Facebook, Google, or any OpenID
// Connect-compatible identity provider.
//
// Eg:-
//
// $ curl https://minio:9000/?Action=AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity&WebIdentityToken=<jwt>
func (sts *stsAPIHandlers) AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
sts.AssumeRoleWithSSO(w, r)
}
// AssumeRoleWithClientGrants - implementation of AWS STS extension API supporting
// OAuth2.0 client credential grants.
//
// Eg:-
//
// $ curl https://minio:9000/?Action=AssumeRoleWithClientGrants&Token=<jwt>
func (sts *stsAPIHandlers) AssumeRoleWithClientGrants(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
sts.AssumeRoleWithSSO(w, r)
}
// AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity - implements user auth against LDAP server
func (sts *stsAPIHandlers) AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := newContext(r, w, "AssumeRoleWithLDAPIdentity")
claims := make(map[string]interface{})
defer logger.AuditLog(ctx, w, r, claims, stsLDAPPassword)
// Parse the incoming form data.
if err := parseForm(r); err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, err)
return
}
if r.Form.Get(stsVersion) != stsAPIVersion {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSMissingParameter,
fmt.Errorf("Invalid STS API version %s, expecting %s", r.Form.Get("Version"), stsAPIVersion))
return
}
ldapUsername := r.Form.Get(stsLDAPUsername)
ldapPassword := r.Form.Get(stsLDAPPassword)
if ldapUsername == "" || ldapPassword == "" {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSMissingParameter, fmt.Errorf("LDAPUsername and LDAPPassword cannot be empty"))
return
}
action := r.Form.Get(stsAction)
switch action {
case ldapIdentity:
default:
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, fmt.Errorf("Unsupported action %s", action))
return
}
sessionPolicyStr := r.Form.Get(stsPolicy)
// https://docs.aws.amazon.com/STS/latest/APIReference/API_AssumeRole.html
// The plain text that you use for both inline and managed session
// policies shouldn't exceed 2048 characters.
if len(sessionPolicyStr) > 2048 {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, fmt.Errorf("Session policy should not exceed 2048 characters"))
return
}
if len(sessionPolicyStr) > 0 {
sessionPolicy, err := policy.ParseConfig(bytes.NewReader([]byte(sessionPolicyStr)))
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, err)
return
}
// Version in policy must not be empty
if sessionPolicy.Version == "" {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, fmt.Errorf("Version needs to be specified in session policy"))
return
}
}
if !globalIAMSys.Initialized() {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSIAMNotInitialized, errIAMNotInitialized)
return
}
ldapUserDN, groupDistNames, err := globalIAMSys.LDAPConfig.Bind(ldapUsername, ldapPassword)
if err != nil {
err = fmt.Errorf("LDAP server error: %w", err)
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, err)
return
}
// Check if this user or their groups have a policy applied.
ldapPolicies, err := globalIAMSys.PolicyDBGet(ldapUserDN, groupDistNames...)
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
return
}
if len(ldapPolicies) == 0 && newGlobalAuthZPluginFn() == nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue,
fmt.Errorf("expecting a policy to be set for user `%s` or one of their groups: `%s` - rejecting this request",
ldapUserDN, strings.Join(groupDistNames, "`,`")))
return
}
expiryDur, err := globalIAMSys.LDAPConfig.GetExpiryDuration(r.Form.Get(stsDurationSeconds))
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, err)
return
}
claims[expClaim] = UTCNow().Add(expiryDur).Unix()
claims[ldapUser] = ldapUserDN
claims[ldapUserN] = ldapUsername
if len(sessionPolicyStr) > 0 {
claims[policy.SessionPolicyName] = base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(sessionPolicyStr))
}
secret, err := getTokenSigningKey()
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
return
}
cred, err := auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(claims, secret)
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
return
}
// Set the parent of the temporary access key, this is useful
// in obtaining service accounts by this cred.
cred.ParentUser = ldapUserDN
// Set this value to LDAP groups, LDAP user can be part
// of large number of groups
cred.Groups = groupDistNames
// Set the newly generated credentials, policyName is empty on purpose
// LDAP policies are applied automatically using their ldapUser, ldapGroups
// mapping.
updatedAt, err := globalIAMSys.SetTempUser(ctx, cred.AccessKey, cred, "")
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
return
}
// Call hook for site replication.
replLogIf(ctx, globalSiteReplicationSys.IAMChangeHook(ctx, madmin.SRIAMItem{
Type: madmin.SRIAMItemSTSAcc,
STSCredential: &madmin.SRSTSCredential{
AccessKey: cred.AccessKey,
SecretKey: cred.SecretKey,
SessionToken: cred.SessionToken,
ParentUser: cred.ParentUser,
},
UpdatedAt: updatedAt,
}))
ldapIdentityResponse := &AssumeRoleWithLDAPResponse{
Result: LDAPIdentityResult{
Credentials: cred,
},
}
ldapIdentityResponse.ResponseMetadata.RequestID = w.Header().Get(xhttp.AmzRequestID)
encodedSuccessResponse := encodeResponse(ldapIdentityResponse)
writeSuccessResponseXML(w, encodedSuccessResponse)
}
// AssumeRoleWithCertificate implements user authentication with client certificates.
// It verifies the client-provided X.509 certificate, maps the certificate to an S3 policy
// and returns temp. S3 credentials to the client.
//
// API endpoint: https://minio:9000?Action=AssumeRoleWithCertificate&Version=2011-06-15
func (sts *stsAPIHandlers) AssumeRoleWithCertificate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := newContext(r, w, "AssumeRoleWithCertificate")
claims := make(map[string]interface{})
defer logger.AuditLog(ctx, w, r, claims)
if !globalIAMSys.Initialized() {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSIAMNotInitialized, errIAMNotInitialized)
return
}
if !globalIAMSys.STSTLSConfig.Enabled {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSNotInitialized, errors.New("STS API 'AssumeRoleWithCertificate' is disabled"))
return
}
// We have to establish a TLS connection and the
// client must provide exactly one client certificate.
// Otherwise, we don't have a certificate to verify or
// the policy lookup would ambiguous.
if r.TLS == nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInsecureConnection, errors.New("No TLS connection attempt"))
return
}
// A client may send a certificate chain such that we end up
// with multiple peer certificates. However, we can only accept
// a single client certificate. Otherwise, the certificate to
// policy mapping would be ambiguous.
// However, we can filter all CA certificates and only check
// whether they client has sent exactly one (non-CA) leaf certificate.
peerCertificates := make([]*x509.Certificate, 0, len(r.TLS.PeerCertificates))
for _, cert := range r.TLS.PeerCertificates {
if cert.IsCA {
continue
}
peerCertificates = append(peerCertificates, cert)
}
r.TLS.PeerCertificates = peerCertificates
// Now, we have to check that the client has provided exactly one leaf
// certificate that we can map to a policy.
if len(r.TLS.PeerCertificates) == 0 {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSMissingParameter, errors.New("No client certificate provided"))
return
}
if len(r.TLS.PeerCertificates) > 1 {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, errors.New("More than one client certificate provided"))
return
}
certificate := r.TLS.PeerCertificates[0]
if !globalIAMSys.STSTLSConfig.InsecureSkipVerify { // Verify whether the client certificate has been issued by a trusted CA.
_, err := certificate.Verify(x509.VerifyOptions{
KeyUsages: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{
x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth,
},
Roots: globalRootCAs,
})
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidClientCertificate, err)
return
}
} else {
// Technically, there is no security argument for verifying the key usage
// when we don't verify that the certificate has been issued by a trusted CA.
// Any client can create a certificate with arbitrary key usage settings.
//
// However, this check ensures that a certificate with an invalid key usage
// gets rejected even when we skip certificate verification. This helps
// clients detect malformed certificates during testing instead of e.g.
// a self-signed certificate that works while a comparable certificate
// issued by a trusted CA fails due to the MinIO server being less strict
// w.r.t. key usage verification.
//
// Basically, MinIO is more consistent (from a client perspective) when
// we verify the key usage all the time.
var validKeyUsage bool
for _, usage := range certificate.ExtKeyUsage {
if usage == x509.ExtKeyUsageAny || usage == x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth {
validKeyUsage = true
break
}
}
if !validKeyUsage {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSMissingParameter, errors.New("certificate is not valid for client authentication"))
return
}
}
// We map the X.509 subject common name to the policy. So, a client
// with the common name "foo" will be associated with the policy "foo".
// Other mapping functions - e.g. public-key hash based mapping - are
// possible but not implemented.
//
// Group mapping is not possible with standard X.509 certificates.
if certificate.Subject.CommonName == "" {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSMissingParameter, errors.New("certificate subject CN cannot be empty"))
return
}
expiry, err := globalIAMSys.STSTLSConfig.GetExpiryDuration(r.Form.Get(stsDurationSeconds))
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSMissingParameter, err)
return
}
// We set the expiry of the temp. credentials to the minimum of the
// configured expiry and the duration until the certificate itself
// expires.
// We must not issue credentials that out-live the certificate.
if validUntil := time.Until(certificate.NotAfter); validUntil < expiry {
expiry = validUntil
}
// Associate any service accounts to the certificate CN
parentUser := "tls:" + certificate.Subject.CommonName
claims[expClaim] = UTCNow().Add(expiry).Unix()
claims[subClaim] = certificate.Subject.CommonName
claims[audClaim] = certificate.Subject.Organization
claims[issClaim] = certificate.Issuer.CommonName
claims[parentClaim] = parentUser
secretKey, err := getTokenSigningKey()
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
return
}
tmpCredentials, err := auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(claims, secretKey)
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
return
}
tmpCredentials.ParentUser = parentUser
policyName := certificate.Subject.CommonName
updatedAt, err := globalIAMSys.SetTempUser(ctx, tmpCredentials.AccessKey, tmpCredentials, policyName)
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
return
}
// Call hook for site replication.
replLogIf(ctx, globalSiteReplicationSys.IAMChangeHook(ctx, madmin.SRIAMItem{
Type: madmin.SRIAMItemSTSAcc,
STSCredential: &madmin.SRSTSCredential{
AccessKey: tmpCredentials.AccessKey,
SecretKey: tmpCredentials.SecretKey,
SessionToken: tmpCredentials.SessionToken,
ParentUser: tmpCredentials.ParentUser,
ParentPolicyMapping: policyName,
},
UpdatedAt: updatedAt,
}))
response := new(AssumeRoleWithCertificateResponse)
response.Result.Credentials = tmpCredentials
response.Metadata.RequestID = w.Header().Get(xhttp.AmzRequestID)
writeSuccessResponseXML(w, encodeResponse(response))
}
// AssumeRoleWithCustomToken implements user authentication with custom tokens.
// These tokens are opaque to MinIO and are verified by a configured (external)
// Identity Management Plugin.
//
// API endpoint: https://minio:9000?Action=AssumeRoleWithCustomToken&Token=xxx
func (sts *stsAPIHandlers) AssumeRoleWithCustomToken(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx := newContext(r, w, "AssumeRoleWithCustomToken")
claims := make(map[string]interface{})
auditLogFilterKeys := []string{stsToken}
defer logger.AuditLog(ctx, w, r, claims, auditLogFilterKeys...)
if !globalIAMSys.Initialized() {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSIAMNotInitialized, errIAMNotInitialized)
return
}
authn := newGlobalAuthNPluginFn()
if authn == nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSNotInitialized, errors.New("STS API 'AssumeRoleWithCustomToken' is disabled"))
return
}
action := r.Form.Get(stsAction)
if action != customTokenIdentity {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, fmt.Errorf("Unsupported action %s", action))
return
}
token := r.Form.Get(stsToken)
if token == "" {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, fmt.Errorf("Invalid empty `Token` parameter provided"))
return
}
durationParam := r.Form.Get(stsDurationSeconds)
var requestedDuration int
if durationParam != "" {
var err error
requestedDuration, err = strconv.Atoi(durationParam)
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, fmt.Errorf("Invalid requested duration: %s", durationParam))
return
}
}
roleArnStr := r.Form.Get(stsRoleArn)
roleArn, _, err := globalIAMSys.GetRolePolicy(roleArnStr)
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue,
fmt.Errorf("Error processing parameter %s: %v", stsRoleArn, err))
return
}
res, err := authn.Authenticate(roleArn, token)
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInvalidParameterValue, err)
return
}
// If authentication failed, return the error message to the user.
if res.Failure != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSUpstreamError, errors.New(res.Failure.Reason))
return
}
// It is required that parent user be set.
if res.Success.User == "" {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSUpstreamError, errors.New("A valid user was not returned by the authenticator."))
return
}
// Expiry is set as minimum of requested value and value allowed by auth
// plugin.
expiry := res.Success.MaxValiditySeconds
if durationParam != "" && requestedDuration < expiry {
expiry = requestedDuration
}
parentUser := "custom:" + res.Success.User
// metadata map
claims[expClaim] = UTCNow().Add(time.Duration(expiry) * time.Second).Unix()
claims[subClaim] = parentUser
claims[roleArnClaim] = roleArn.String()
claims[parentClaim] = parentUser
// Add all other claims from the plugin **without** replacing any
// existing claims.
for k, v := range res.Success.Claims {
if _, ok := claims[k]; !ok {
claims[k] = v
}
}
secretKey, err := getTokenSigningKey()
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
return
}
tmpCredentials, err := auth.GetNewCredentialsWithMetadata(claims, secretKey)
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
return
}
tmpCredentials.ParentUser = parentUser
updatedAt, err := globalIAMSys.SetTempUser(ctx, tmpCredentials.AccessKey, tmpCredentials, "")
if err != nil {
writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
return
}
// Call hook for site replication.
replLogIf(ctx, globalSiteReplicationSys.IAMChangeHook(ctx, madmin.SRIAMItem{
Type: madmin.SRIAMItemSTSAcc,
STSCredential: &madmin.SRSTSCredential{
AccessKey: tmpCredentials.AccessKey,
SecretKey: tmpCredentials.SecretKey,
SessionToken: tmpCredentials.SessionToken,
ParentUser: tmpCredentials.ParentUser,
},
UpdatedAt: updatedAt,
}))
response := new(AssumeRoleWithCustomTokenResponse)
response.Result.Credentials = tmpCredentials
response.Result.AssumedUser = parentUser
response.Metadata.RequestID = w.Header().Get(xhttp.AmzRequestID)
writeSuccessResponseXML(w, encodeResponse(response))
}